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Abstract 
This study measures risk and loss aversion using Prospect Theory and the impact of 
emotions on those parameters. Our controlled experiment at two universities in 
Mexico City, using uncompensated students as research subjects, found results 
similar to those obtained by Tanaka et al. (2010). In order to study the role of 
emotions, we provided subjects with randomly varied information on rising deaths 
due to drug violence in Mexico and also on youth unemployment. In agreement with 
previous studies, we find that risk aversion on the gains domain decreases with age 
and income. We also find that loss aversion decreases with income and is less for 
students in public universities. With regard to emotions, risk aversion increases with 
sadness and loss aversion is negatively influenced by anger. On the loss domain, 
anger dominates sadness. On average, anger reduces loss aversion by half. 
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Highlights: 
• We conducted a Prospect Theory experiment in Mexico.  
• The experiment randomly framed students into different emotions. 
• Emotions were prompted by information on the rising number of deaths due to 
drug violence in Mexico and on youth unemployment. 
• Sadness increases risk aversion over gains, and anger decreases loss aversion. 
• On average, anger reduces loss aversion by half. 
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1 Introduction  
Understanding human preferences over uncertain outcomes is a key issue in many 
subjects in the field of economics. Risk attitudes can create speculative bubbles and 
crashes in financial markets (De Long et al., 1991). High risk aversion can explain why 
some countries do not invest in business opportunities, capital, or human capital (Shaw, 
1996; Hartog and Diaz-Serrano, 2007; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). In fact, the effects 
of public policy depend on the level of risk aversion in a society (credit incentives, 
fiscal taxation programs, etc.). These are only a few examples of why decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty is important, and there are still many unanswered 
questions in the field. 
Risk aversion is generally associated with the properties of the utility function that 
are consistent with expected utility theory (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). Recent 
literature provides many well-documented examples, under diverse scenarios, that 
suggest Prospect Theory (PT) as the best way to model choice under uncertainty (an 
important example can be found in List, 2004, where participants in a well-functioning 
marketplace behave according to PT). In order to achieve a deeper knowledge of human 
preferences, a behavioral approach like PT seems essential. Nevertheless, the literature 
addressing differences in specific characteristics at the time of decision making is still 
under development and remains mostly unclear. 
One important element missing from this work is the role of the emotions in 
Prospect Theory, mainly because they are difficult to measure. It is well documented 
that humans behave differently depending on their emotional states.1 Under specific 
circumstances, people, cities, and even countries can become emotionally affected. This 
                                                 
1 For example, depressed people tend to overeat (Smith, 2009), frightened individuals tend to react 
impulsively, and angry people tend to act recklessly (Ahn, 2010). 
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emotional impact is one reason for the importance to economists of the effect of 
emotions on risky decisions. Public policy, market prognosis, and mechanism design 
may have different implications if we consider the emotional impact on risk behavior. 
The goals of this study are to measure risk and loss aversion using Prospect Theory 
and the impact of emotions on the parameters that characterize them. We conducted a 
controlled experiment at two universities in Mexico City. The experimental design, 
which followed that of Tanaka et al. (2010) except in our use of uncompensated 
subjects, allowed us to obtain the parameters of the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 
value function and the probability weights for each individual. The CPT and the 
probability function are characterized by three parameters: the curvature of the function 
that assigns value to the prospects (i.e. lotteries) (σ), the coefficient of loss aversion (λ), 
and the one-parameter in Prelec’s weighting function (α). The average individual in our 
sample has values of 0.47, 2.29, and 0.71 for σ, λ, and α, respectively. Although our 
study used only uncompensated subjects, these values are similar to those obtained in 
the study by Tanaka et al. (2010). We were also able to gather respondents' 
socioeconomic variables and information about their emotions after reading about 
different dramatic situations. 
To gather data on emotions, we randomly varied different questions across subjects 
just before the elicitation of the structural parameters of CPT. One third of the subjects 
received a questionnaire that asked them how they felt about rising violence and deaths 
in Mexico.2 Another third received an additional questionnaire about their feelings 
regarding youth unemployment. The final third, a control group, did not receive any 
information about violence or unemployment. Consistent with Lerner et al. (2003), we 
                                                 
2 According to the Attorney General's Office the number of deaths caused by the drug war in 2005 was 
2,221, while for 2010 this number increased to 15,273. 
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find that risk aversion is related to emotional state; in particular, we find that sad people 
are more risk averse in the gain domain. We also find that angry people are less loss 
averse, and that anger has a larger impact on the loss domain than sadness. While sad 
people become more risk loving on the loss domain than the norm, anger reduces the 
loss aversion by half. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to explain the effect of emotions on the 
parameters that characterize a Cumulative Prospect Theory value function, and it may 
also be the first risk aversion analysis for Mexico. Hence, this paper makes a 
contribution to the literature of Prospect Theory, the literature of behavioral economics, 
and to public policy design research, especially in the case of Mexico. Literature of the 
relevant economic theory is reviewed in Section 2, experimental design is explained in 
Section 3, data analysis is presented in Section 4, the main results are shown in Section 
5, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
2 Review of the Literature and Economic Theory 
2.1  Prospect Theory 
Developments in the field of psychology led Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to the 
development of Prospect Theory. One important finding in the PT literature was 
evidence against classical Expected Utility Theory (EU), which tested the hypothesis 
that the weighting probability parameters are different from one. Another line of 
investigation--the approach we take--attempts to explain how certain individual 
characteristics affect the degree of loss aversion or risk aversion. 
We use an extension of PT known as Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), proposed 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The general model of CPT is described by the 
following equation: 
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                                      𝑉(𝑥𝑖)  = �𝜋𝑖+𝑛
𝑖=0
(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥𝑖) + � 𝜋𝑖−0
𝑖=−𝑚
(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥𝑖)                          (1) 
where the first sum is over the positive prospects (non-negative outcomes only) 
associated with nonlinear weights (from 𝟎 to 𝒏), and the second over negative prospects 
(non-positive outcomes only, −𝒎 to 𝟎). Hence, a parametric representation of CPT has 
parameters that identify the curvature of the value function of prospects, parameters that 
identify the weights of the probabilities, and parameters that indicate the degree of loss 
aversion.  
The literature of PT includes a variety of different methods for elicitation of the 
parameters that identify risky decisions. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) propose a method that 
begins with the certainty equivalent (CE) for gains; they then recover the CE for losses 
and finally link them. Because this method requires subjects to make calculations to 
propose a certainty equivalent, agents may not give their true CE value. For example, in 
an experiment with time constraints, calculations performed under pressure may be less 
accurate.  
Tanaka et al. (2010) propose the TCN Eliciting Method.3 In TCN there are three 
ordered sequences of lotteries. In the first two, they identify the parameter of the 
curvature in the gains domain and the one-parameter of the Prelec (1998) probability 
weighting function. In the last sequence they identify the loss aversion parameter. This 
is a simpler procedure, but it has some restrictive assumptions.4 In spite of these 
                                                 
3 Following Harrison and Rutström (2008)  we denominate TCN as the method used in Tanaka et al. 
(2010). 
4 The method assumes the same probability weighting function for gains and losses and elicits the loss 
aversion parameter assuming a previously correct elicitation of the parameter that identifies the curvature 
of the function. Although some may argue that assuming the same value for the curvature over gains and 
losses is restrictive, several papers have found the same value estimating the parameters separately, see 
Abdellaoui (2000), Abdellaoui et al. (2005), Andersen et al. (2006), Donkers et al. (2001), Fehr-Duda et 
al. (2006) and  Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
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restrictions, we use this approach; our application of the method will be described in full 
in Section 3. 
In the experiment of Tanaka et al. (2010), using data from rural Vietnamese 
villages and a national survey, the elicited parameters were 2.63 for loss aversion and 
0.59 for the curvature of the value function (i.e., the average agent is loss averse, risk 
averse over gains, and risk loving over losses). Their empirical regression allowed them 
to conclude, among other things, that being older reduces the level of risk aversion. 
However, their sample comes from a particular experimental population, so additional 
studies are needed to demonstrate external validity. 
Holt and Laury (2002) carried out a study with 175 people to determine the 
constant relative risk aversion (0.26).  They outline some important observations for 
such research, among them that hypothetical payments do not affect the estimated 
coefficient of risk aversion, at least for low outcomes.5 This evidence is important given 
that the subjects of our study are not compensated. 
2.2  Emotions and Behavioral Economics 
Framing effects are quite useful in obtaining relevant information from subjects. 
DellaVigna (2009) discusses a number of experiments where modification in the way a 
question is framed produces different results. In our study, we randomly frame subjects 
into different emotions and analyze how they make risky decisions.  
Using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Dohmen et al. (2010) carried out a 
risk aversion study with cognitive implications. They asked approximately 1,000 
individuals to choose between ordered pair lotteries, and used the results to propose a 
measure of risk willingness. Subjects were also asked to take a cognitive exam, and the 
                                                 
5 Their study used low outcomes of $2-4 USD, and then scale the payoff by 20, 50 and 90 times the low 
payoff. They varied hypothetical and real payoffs.  
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researchers found a significant negative correlation between the level of risk willingness 
and the exam results. In our study we recorded respondents' self-reported average 
grades from the previous semester, allowing us to control for cognitive abilities. 
According to behavioral theories, emotions can affect agents' decisions. Turvey et 
al. (2010) show that fear can shape the way individuals make economic decisions, in 
particular fear can diminish the optimal levels of consumption. In choice under 
uncertainty, Lerner et al. (2003) show that frightened people are more risk averse and 
that angry people are more risk loving.6 Feagin (1988) established the differentiation of 
an empathic and a sympathetic reaction to feelings, arguing that people imagine beliefs 
with which they can generate an empathic emotion related to a fictional character. 
People worry about the troubles of fictional characters mainly because they believe that 
something bad will happen to them. These beliefs are not real but imagined, but 
fictional beliefs lead to real emotions and real decisions. 
Drawing on these ideas, we use the unfortunate situation of crime and violence in 
Mexico to elicit risk preferences under emotional treatments. We frame the respondents 
into different emotional states (anger, sadness, and fearfulness) in order to gauge 
variation in their risk and loss aversions.  
3 Experimental Design 
Our experiment was conducted in two different universities in Mexico City, one 
public and the other private, during November 2011. All respondents were students at 
their respective universities. We went to classrooms and asked if we could conduct an 
experiment; if we got a positive answer we would return, usually 25 minutes before the 
                                                 
6 These results on emotions are also observed in Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001).We do not find 
significant results in such emotions with respect to risk aversion, however the authors do not use prospect 
theory and loss aversion is not considered by them. Indeed, we find a significant result for anger in the 
loss aversion parameter. 
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class ended. We had no special order of selection; we walked randomly around each 
campus, knocking on classroom doors. However, it is important to mention that 
students majoring in economics make up 38% of our sample.7 We offered no 
compensation for participation in the experiment; we told subjects they would be 
participating in a study to understand job employment prospects for recent college 
graduates, and that it was important to answer questions truthfully.8 Each experiment 
took no longer than 20 minutes, and was divided into three sections: sociodemographic 
characteristics, emotional framing, and risk aversion.9  
The main part of the experiment consisted of choosing lotteries. In many 
experiments described in the literature, respondents are compensated after completing 
lotteries.10 We decided against compensation, mainly because in Mexican universities 
such procedures are not common or culturally appropriate. Holt and Laury (2002) find 
that behavior towards risk taking is affected if high incentives are offered as a possible 
outcome. Nevertheless, the largest theoretical payoff in our experiment is only $1,700 
pesos (approximately $125 USD). This amount is relatively small given that it 
represents only 12% of the self-reported expected monthly salary after graduation 
($1,077 USD). Moreover, the median payoff in the high payment lottery we implement 
is $167 MXP ($12 USD). Hence, we believe the results of our experiment are not biased 
as a result of the use of volunteer subjects. In fact, we find results similar to those of 
                                                 
7 This is mainly because we are more acquainted with the professors that teach economics. 
8 In Mexico it is unusual to conduct experiments using college students as subjects, or even to use them as 
assistants. However, we found no resistance to participation in the experiment; in general, students were 
enthusiastic about taking part in the study. As we told students that the main goal of the questionnaire was 
to understand job prospects, we included queries on expectations regarding salary and labor force 
participation. 
9 Two pilot studies were conducted before the experimentat a different university. Based on students' 
responses and recommendations about the instructions and the pool of available answers, we constructed 
a new experimental design. No further improvements were suggested in the second pilot, implying that 
respondents felt comfortable with the experiment. 
10 Occasionally they paid respondents the prize of the lottery described or simply compensated them for 
answering the questionnaire. 
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Tanaka et al. (2010), who conducted the same experiment with compensated subjects, 
leading us to believe, following Holt and Laury (2002), that the experiment is not 
affected by small monetary payoffs.11 
3.1 Sociodemographic Characteristics 
The first part of the experiment consisted of several questions about personal 
sociodemographic characteristics. With these questions we were able to identify the age, 
sex, and academic major of the students. These data allowed us to divide the groups for 
distinct interpretation of the parameters of the CPT function.  
In order to find control variables for wealth and socioeconomic status, we asked for 
information about the level of education of the subjects' parents, as well as two income 
proxy questions about the number of rooms in their homes and cars in their 
households.12 Finally, we asked about their future salary expectations, the lapse 
between finishing their undergraduate degrees and finding a job, and whether they 
worked during the week. These answers helped us to identify the subjects' good faith 
participation in the experiment, as discussed in Section 4. 
3.2 Emotional Framing 
To create an effective framing effect, we drew upon the unfortunate social situation 
in Mexico of deaths related to drug violence. We gave this framing treatment to two-
thirds of the study group; the other third received no framing. There were two kinds of 
framing treatment: strong and moderate. The strong version contained two questions, 
                                                 
11 It is worth mentioning that our results are very similar to those  experiments where individuals were 
paid. For the curvature parameter of the value function  see Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Tanaka et al. 
(2010) , Wu and Gonzalez (1996) and Liu (Forthcoming). The loss aversion parameter is very close to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Tanaka et al. (2010) and Fehr-Duda et al. (2006) and Liu (Forthcoming). 
Finally, our elicited value for the reweighting factor is very similar to Tu (2005) , Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) and  extremely close to Tanaka et al. (2010). Hence, we do not consider that our unpaid 
experiment affects our main results. 
12 In Mexico most students do not know their exact family income. 
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while the moderate treatment contained only one. Respondents were unable to identify 
whether their peers received a different questionnaire. The first question, used in both 
treatments, was as follows: 
From 2006 to 2010 almost 40,000 people died as a result of the drug war. Insecurity 
levels haven’t gone down in any region; on the contrary, the country is living the largest 
wave of violence ever seen. How does this make you feel? 
The question may be shocking, but some students may not be aware of its 
magnitude because they may be unacquainted with the topic.13 To avoid this issue, in 
the strong treatment we added an even better-known situation. The second question 
(used only in the strong treatment) was the following: 
The financial crisis of 2008 has left the international financial markets in tatters. 
The newspaper El Economista has reported that 2010 showed the largest unemployment 
rate for young people worldwide. Also, experts predict another economic recession for 
2012. How does this make you feel? 
We believe this question may impact students more directly because most of them 
seek to enter the workforce after finishing their degrees (almost 97%, according to our 
survey). It is worth mentioning that these questions were asked before the risk aversion 
section, so we expect them to have a framing impact on the decisions made when 
choosing lotteries (as discussed in Section 2.2).  
The multiple-choice options for both questions are (i) anger, (ii) sadness, (iii) 
fear/uncertainty, and (iv) indifference.14 Among individuals who received the violence 
framing, 39% reported feeling angry, 19% sad, and 37% fearful/uncertain. Among those 
                                                 
13 One of the least affected regions is Mexico City, where our experiment was conducted. Thus, a student 
who does not follow the news could be less aware of the subject. 
14 Because some individuals may not care about the framing situation, we decided to include an option for 
“indifference.” With this option we intended to avoid individuals feeding us false answers, for example 
by responding that they experienced emotions they were not really feeling. 
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who received the youth unemployment framing in addition to the violence framing, 
20% reported feeling angry, 11% sad, and 64% fearful/uncertain.  
3.3 Risk Aversion 
In order to elicit the parameters of the CPT function, we conducted a replica of the 
experiment designed in Tanaka et al. (2010). As mentioned before, the implementation 
is straightforward and simplifies the function to only three parameters. Prelec’s one-
parameter probability weighting function is used. Tanaka et al. (2010) mostly confirm 
the main findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). One important assumption is that 
the agents rethink the probabilities in the same way for gains or losses. The probability 
weighting function is 
                                                   𝜋+      (𝑝) = 𝜋−(𝑝) = 1
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛(1/𝑝)]𝛼                          (2)  
In this experiment the prospects contain only two possible outcomes, so Equation 
(1) simplifies to: (1 − 𝝅(𝒑))𝒗(𝒚) + 𝝅(𝒑)𝒗(𝒙) (for 𝒙𝒚 > 0 and |𝒙| > |𝒚|) or (𝒑)𝒗(𝒙) + 𝝅(𝒒)𝒗(𝒚) , where 𝒑 and 𝒒 are the true probabilities of the outcomes 𝒙 and 
𝒚 (for 𝑦 > 0 > 𝑥). Tanaka et al. (2010) assume a piecewise power function defined as 
follows: 
                                     𝑣(𝑥) = �𝑥𝜎 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥 > 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝜎 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥 < 0                                               (3)  
With this specification, 𝝈 and 𝝀 represent the concavity of the value function and 
the degree of loss aversion respectively (we use the term value or utility function in 
reference to Equation (3), below).  
To elicit the three parameters we use the TCN method. First, the respondent faced 
three series of paired lotteries, as shown in Table 1. Each row contains the possible 
outcome in Mexican pesos for Lottery A and Lottery B. The probabilities of the 
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outcomes in both lotteries are fixed throughout the series. The TCN experimental design 
enforced monotonic switching by asking the subjects at which question they would 
change from Lottery A to Lottery B. Respondents could change to Lottery B at the first 
question or they could stay with Lottery A throughout. 
We follow Tanaka et al. (2010) in order to estimate the structural parameters. With 
the parametric function in the first series, it is possible to find an interval for 𝜎 and 𝛼. It 
is worth noting that we used only rounded midpoints for this interval. For example, a 
subject changing from A to B in the 7th scenario of the first series would first have the 
following rationalizable (𝛼,𝜎) combinations: (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), 
(0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), and  (1, 1).15 If this same subject changes from A to B in the 7th 
scenario of the second series, his or her rationalizable combinations of (𝛼,𝜎) would be: 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.6, 0.8), (0.5, 0.9), and (0.4, 1). By intersecting both parameters 
we get the approximation of the parameters (𝛼,𝜎) = (0.7, 0.7). 
Finally, the loss aversion parameter 𝜆 is partially identified with the third series. 
Here the TCN method assumes that 𝜎 is correctly identified in the previous series. 
Using the value of 𝜎 we are able to identify 𝜆 in an interval. Series 3 was constructed to 
assure similar values of 𝜆 across different levels of 𝜎. Table 2 shows examples of the 
interval of 𝜆 given some fixed values of 𝜎. 
4  Data Analysis 
The experiment included 700 subjects; however, 93 questionnaires were discarded 
before data analysis because they showed a clear disregard of the instructions or an 
unwillingness to take the experiment seriously. Discarded questionnaires showed 
                                                 
15  Rationalizable combinations are those parameters that satisfy the condition that Lottery B provides 
more utility than lottery A.   
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inconsistencies in the sociodemographic questions or errors in the risk aversion 
section.16 
Our final experimental data thus consists of 607 subjects, where 53 percent of the 
sample comes from the private university and the remainder from the public one; 
summary statistics are presented in Table 3, Column 1. The average values are 
reasonable for the subject population of Mexican college students. Fifty-five percent of 
the respondents are male and the average age is almost 21 years (in Mexico most 
students begin college at 18). Only 30 percent of our experimental sample had 
scholarships, and subjects worked an average of 4 hours per week (the mean here is low 
because most do not work at all). The average student is in the middle of his or her 
education (in Mexico it takes 4.5 years to graduate from college). The average parent 
(father or mother) has at least a high school diploma. We use the number of bedrooms 
and cars in the family household as proxy variables for family income:  they have on 
average 3.5 rooms and 2 cars. After they graduate they expect to earn an average of 
$14,535 Mexican pesos per month (approximately $1,100 USD). 
Working with emotions is complicated because it may be argued that subjects are 
not feeling the emotions when they respond. Nevertheless, some psychological 
literature argues against this criticism. Field studies on drama advertising, like Escalas 
and Stern (2003), find a high degree of emotional reaction in subjects reading fictional 
dramatic situations. They also show that the emotional response is sympathetic and 
empathic, in contrast with previous studies that found only an empathic reaction. Shu et 
al. (2011) also found a change in moral behavior when an ethics code is read before 
taking a test. As already mentioned, Feagin (1988) showed that real emotions can be 
                                                 
16 For example, subjects who marked multiple switching points where they were supposed to mark only 
one. 
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produced from fictional situations. With these observations in mind, the remaining 
concern is the causality of the emotion with respect to risky attitudes. Addressing this 
issue, Table 3 contains the results of the randomization test on means of the emotional 
treatment. None of the differences are statistically significant. This means that the 
characteristics of subjects are random between treatment and control groups, so we can 
interpret the role of emotions on risk attitudes as causal. 
5 Results 
In our sample the average elicited value for the curvature of the value function (𝝈) 
is 0.471, which is reasonably close to the findings of 𝝈=0.58 in Tanaka et al. (2010) and 
𝝈=0.48 in Liu (Forthcoming). If we assume that the EU axioms hold, the relative risk 
aversion coefficient 𝒓 is 0.53. A kernel distribution of the parameter is presented in 
Figure 1, which shows that the majority of the respondents are located around 0.5, a 
common result in the risk aversion literature. This result suggests that our experiment 
was implemented correctly, and that an experiment with uncompensated subjects does 
not affect the curvature of the value function.  
In order to link the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics with the 
curvature of the CPT function, we conducted the following OLS regression:                                                         𝜎𝑖 = �𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑖 + �𝐸𝑖𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                          (4)  
 
where 𝑋 denotes observable characteristics and 𝐸 denotes emotions. Table 4 
presents the results for four different models. The first column includes 
sociodemographic characteristics (No Treatment). The second column adds emotions 
referring to questions about violence (Moderate Treatment). The third column includes 
dummy variables of emotions reported in both questions (Either Treatment). In other 
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words, the dummy variable of anger takes a value of 1 when an individual responds 
with the emotion of anger for either the violence or the youth unemployment question. 
The fourth column captures the intersection of both questions (Strong Treatment).17 
The results show a positive impact of age over the value of sigma of the value 
function. The same effect occurs with years left until graduation. Both effects can be 
interpreted as a decrease in risk aversion (higher curvature) level in the gain domain, but 
they may also be interpreted as a decrease in risk willingness in the loss domain. These 
results are in agreement with the literature (Harrison and Rutström, 2008; Halek and 
Eisenhauer, 2001; Donkers et al., 2001). The common explanation for this phenomenon 
comes from the idea that older people are capable of taking more risks when there is an 
opportunity to win, but they also have experience that tells them it is better to lose a 
little when faced with the possibility of losing a lot. 
Also consistent with previous literature (Hartog and Diaz-Serrano, 2007; Dohmen 
et al. 2010; Shaw, 1996), the level of curvature 𝜎 in the four models increases with the 
proxy variables for income (automobiles and rooms). In contrast to studies reporting 
gender differences in risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 
2008), we do not find any significant gender effect. Nor do we find any relation of 
cognitive ability, as measured by GPA, to the curvature of the utility function.  
Estimating the effect of emotions on the curvature of the utility function was one of 
the key goals of this study. Columns 2 to 4 show the main results. Among possible 
emotions, there is a statistically significant link between sadness and the curvature 
parameter 𝜎 (-0.077). On average, risk aversion over gains increases strongly when 
                                                 
17 We also conducted an OLS regression using just a dummy variable for treatment (equal to one when 
the individual received either framing). In any framing event or combination of events, there were no 
significant effects. This response is possibly due to the fact that emotional reactions may have opposite 
effects: sad people may be less risk averse but angry ones may be more risk loving. 
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people are sad. As a consequence, public policy relying on credit incentives or risky 
business opportunities may not have the desired effect if the average feeling in the 
population is consistent with depression. Our result also implies that sad people will 
take more risk when trying to avoid a certain loss. Numerous situations in real life cause 
sadness: natural disasters, unemployment, economic crises. Our results imply that these 
events may affect real outcomes through the channel of emotions. As aforementioned, 
fear has been associated with risk aversion in the literature, however we do not find a 
significant result (see Lerner et al. 2003). One possible explanation might be that our 
treatments did not induce the levels of fear required to affect the behavior under 
uncertainty. In the study of Lerner et al. (2003), the fear emotion was induced by 
recalling the September 11th terrorist attacks. This event was common knowledge for 
almost every American citizen. In contrast, in our study we only use students that reside 
in Mexico City where no drug war occurs. Although the students report to have fear 
about the situation, their security is not directly in danger. Hence, a possible explanation 
for not finding an effect of fear on risk is that students were not induced with the 
required level fear to change behavior.18 
In our sample, the average loss aversion parameter 𝜆 is 2.29, which is close to that 
elicited in Tanaka et al. (2010), 2.63, but closer to the finding of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), 2.25. Figure 2 presents a kernel distribution of the lower limit of 𝜆. It 
shows that agents have a loss aversion coefficient around 2.5, which then starts 
descending. The hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), that people feel twice as 
strongly about losing something than winning it, thus seems appropriate for our sample. 
                                                 
18 In fact the study of  Stemmler et al. (2001) reveals that imaginative fear does not exhibit  the same 
physical reactions than real fear. In contrast, there is no physical diference between real and imaginative 
anger.  
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To estimate the relation between the characteristics and the loss aversion 
coefficient, it is necessary to use a maximum likelihood interval regression. Again, we 
present the same four models of Equation (4), each one corresponding to different 
emotional treatments (or none):19                                    𝜆𝑖 = �𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑖 + �𝐸𝑖𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                            (5)  
 
Table 5 shows the main results. In contrast to the results in Table 4, the loss 
aversion parameter is not correlated with demographic characteristics. Tanaka et al. 
(2010) also find no strong correlations on this parameter. However, we find a significant 
effect of being a student in a private university on the loss aversion parameter: if the 
individual attends a private university, the average degree of loss aversion increases by 
1.25. This result implies that students from private universities suffer more from a loss, 
relative to a gain, than those studying at a public institution. Although we cannot 
disentangle the reasons for the effect, we believe it may be due to differences in self-
confidence of students across university types. The fact that newspapers, for example, 
generally rank students from private universities above public ones in terms of 
employability (Reforma, 2012) should reinforce self-confidence in students of private 
universities. Consistent with this hypothesis, Ahn (2010) finds that loss aversion 
increases with self-confidence in a repeated laboratory experiment.20  
With respect to wealth, we find that an increase in our proxy variable for income 
decreases the level of loss aversion, although the effect is significant only at the 10% 
level. Tanaka et al. (2010) find a similar result and argue that wealthier villages tend to 
invest more, given the fact that they are less loss averse. This suggests that poor people 
                                                 
19 Again, we find no evidence of a significant change in 𝜆 just for receiving the treatment.  
20 In other words, we expect that students from private universities suffer more from the endowment 
effect (Amir et al., 2008; Hossain and List, 2009; Kahneman et al., 1990) 
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would be reluctant to attempt risky business opportunities and would dislike losing, so a 
greater compensation for losses in terms of utility is needed to encourage poorer people 
to take those risks. This is an important implication for public policy. 
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 5 show the role of emotions on the loss aversion 
parameter. In the strong emotional treatment (which is in fact the most accurate, given 
the fact that individuals report the same emotion in both questions), anger reduces the 
degree of loss aversion by 1.101. In percentage terms, other factors being equal, anger 
reduces loss aversion by an average of 52 percent (the mean value of loss aversion is 
2.3). This implies that angry individuals are less sensitive to losses and suffer less from 
the endowment effect (such people would not hold their bonds too long when prices 
fall). 
Finally, in our sample the average value of Prelec’s weighting parameter 𝛼 is 0.713, 
extremely close to the findings in Tanaka et al. (2010) (the average weighting function 
is shown in Figure 3). It is clear that individuals overestimate probabilities under 0.4 
(overestimating even more as probabilities approach zero), but start to underestimate 
them above that level (underestimating more around 0.8). The kernel distribution of 𝛼 is 
presented in Figure 4, where it clearly shows a great accumulation around 0.7 and 
diminishes on both sides. 
We conduct the same regression analysis on 𝛼 but do not find any significant 
effect.21 Figure 5 presents the average value function (Equation 3) and the main results 
of the study in terms of emotions. On average, the function shows concavity on the gain 
domain and convexity on the loss domain. It also shows a steeper slope over the loss 
                                                 
21 Results are available upon request. 
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domain than the gain domain, as in the seminal contribution by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). 
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that sadness causes less risk aversion in the gain domain 
and more risk willingness in the loss domain. Panel B shows that anger decreases loss 
aversion, with the loss domain almost a mirror image of the gain domain. Indeed, anger 
has a larger impact on the loss domain than sadness:  anger decreases loss aversion by 
close to 50 percent. 
 
6  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
We conducted a controlled experiment using students in two universities as 
uncompensated subjects to elicit the parameters of the value and weighting function of 
Cumulative Prospect Theory. On average, we find (𝜎, λ, α) = (0.471, 2.29, 0.713), 
implying that people in our experiment are risk averse on gains and risk loving on 
losses, that they suffer from loss aversion, and that they did not use true probabilities at 
the time of evaluation. Although our study subjects were uncompensated, these 
parameters are very close to the findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Liu 
(Forthcoming), and Tanaka et al. (2010), which is consistent with the compensated and 
uncompensated experiments in Holt and Laury (2002).  
We also analyze the relationship between the structural parameters and 
sociodemographic characteristics. For the curvature function, we find evidence that 
older and wealthier people are less averse in the gain domain but lean toward less risk 
taking in the loss domain. We find that being a student in a private university increases 
loss aversion, and our proxy for income shows that increased income reduces loss 
aversion. Finally, the weighting probability function does not vary with 
sociodemographic characteristics. 
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An important contribution of this paper relates to estimation of the impact of 
emotions on the structural parameters in Cumulative Prospect Theory. In our controlled 
experiment, one-third of the subjects received a questionnaire that asked how they felt 
about the rising rate of violence and deaths in Mexico. Another third received in 
addition a question about their feelings regarding youth unemployment. The final third 
was a control group that did not receive any questions about violence or unemployment.  
Consistent with Lerner et al. (2003), we find that risk aversion is related to 
emotional state. In particular, we find that sad people are more risk averse in the gain 
domain. We also find that angry people are less loss averse than non-angry people. In 
fact, on average, anger reduces loss aversion by half. This could be a sympathetic 
reaction, or it could be that anger fuels the strength to quickly forget a loss. Further 
research in neuroeconomics is needed in order to gain a deeper understanding of this 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
References 
Abdellaoui, M., 2000. "Parameter-Free Elicitation of Utilities and Probability 
Weighting Functions." Management Science 46(11), 1497-1512. 
Abdellaoui, M., Vossmann, F. & Weber, M. (2005). "Choice-Based Elicitation and 
Decomposition of Decision Weights for Gains and Losses under Uncertainty." 
Management Science 51(9), 1384–1399. 
Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H. & L'Haridon, O., 2008. "A Tractable Method to Measure 
Utility and Loss Aversion under Prospect Theory." Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 36(3), 245-266. 
Ahn, H., 2010. "Modeling and Analysis of Affective Influences on Human Experience, 
Prediction, Decision Making, and Behavior." Ph.D. diss. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
Amir, O., Ariely, D. & Carmon, Z., 2008. "The Dissociation between Monetary 
Assessment and Predicted Utility." Marketing Science,  27(6), 1055-1064. 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G.W. & Rutström, E.E., 2006. "Dynamic Choice Behaviour: 
Asset Integration and Natural Reference Points,” Department of Economics, 
College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida. Working 
Paper 06-07, http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/content/archives/06-07Glenn.pdf. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U., 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences." Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47(2), 1-27. 
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H. & Waldmann, R.J., 1991. "The Survival of 
Noise Traders in Financial Markets." Journal of Business, 64(1), 1-19. 
DellaVigna, S., 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field." Journal 
of Economic Literature, 47(2), 315-372. 
  
21 
 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U.,  2010. "Are Risk Aversion and 
Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?" American Economic Review, 100(3), 
1238-60. 
Donkers, B., 2001. "Estimating Risk Attitudes Using Lotteries: A Large Sample 
Approach." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22(2), 165-195. 
Eckel, C.C., & Grossman, P.J., 2008. "Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental 
Evidence." In Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, eds. C.R. Plott and 
V.L. Smith, Vol. 1, Ch. 113, 1061-73.  Amsterdam, N.Y.:  North Holland. 
Escalas, J. E., & Stern, B.B., 2003. "Sympathy and Empathy: Emotional Responses to 
Advertising Dramas." Journal of Consumer Research, 29(4), 566-578. 
Feagin, S. L., 1988. "Imagining Emotions and Appreciating Fiction." Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy, 18(3), 485-500. 
Fehr–Duda, H., de Gennaro, M., & Schubert, R., 2006. "Gender, Financial Risk, and 
Probability Weights." Theory and Decision, 60(2), 283–313. 
Gonzalez, R. & Wu, G., 1999. "On the Form of the Probability Weighting Function." 
Cognitive Psychology, 38, 129-1666 
Halek, M., & Eisenhauer, J.G., 2001. "Demography of Risk Aversion." Journal of  
Risk and Insurance, 68(1), 1-24. 
Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E., 2008. "Risk Aversion in the Laboratory. Risk 
Aversion in Experiments." In Research in Experimental Economics, eds. J.J. 
Cox and G.W. Harrison, Vol. 12, 41-196. New York: JAI Press. 
Hartog, J., & Diaz-Serrano, L., 2007. "Earnings Risk and Demand for Higher 
Education: A Cross-Section Test for Spain." Journal of Applied Economics, 
10(1), 1-28. 
  
22 
 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S.K., 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects." American 
Economic Review, 92(5), 44-55. 
Hossain, T., & List, J.A., 2009. "The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing 
Productivity Using Simple Framing Manipulations." National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 15623. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15623 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A., 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk." Econometrica, 47(2): 263-292. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L. & Thaler, R.H., 1990. "Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem." Journal of Political Economy, 
98(6), 1325–1348. 
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D., 2000. "Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion 
Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice" Cognition and Emotion, 14(4), 
473-493 
Lerner, J., & Keltner, D., 2001. "Fear, Anger and Risk.”  Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81(1), 146-159 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R.M., Small, D.A. & Fischhoff, B., 2003. "Effects of Fear and 
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment." 
Psychological Science, 14(2), 144-150. 
List, J.A., 2004. "Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the 
Marketplace." Econometrica, 72(2), 615-625. 
Liu, E., Forthcoming. "Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology 
Adoption Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China." Review of Economics and 
Statistics. 
  
23 
 
Prelec, D., 1998. "The Probability Weighting Function." Econometrica, 66(3): 342-379. 
Reforma., 2012. “Ranking de las Mejores Universidades 2012.” March 25. 
Shaw, K. L., 1996. "An Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion and Income Growth." 
Journal of Labor Economics, 14(4), 626-653. 
Shu, L., Gino, F. & Bazerman, M.H., 2011. "Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: When 
Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting." 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(3), 330-349. 
Smith, T., 2009. "Reconciling Psychology with Economics: Obesity, Behavioral 
Biology, and Rational Overeating." Journal of Bioeconomics, 11, 249-282. 
Stemmler, G., Heldmann, M., Pauls, C. A. & Scherer, T. 2001,. "Constraints for 
Emotion Specificity in Fear and Anger: The Context Counts" Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 38(2), 275-291 
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C.F. & Nguyen, Q. ,2010. "Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam." American Economic 
Review, 100(1), 557-571. 
Tu, Q., 2005. "Empirical Analysis of Time Preferences and Risk Aversion",  PhD 
Thesis 142, Tilburg University. 
Turvey, C. G., Onyango, B., Cuite, C. & Hallman, W. K., 2010. "Risk, Fear, Bird Flu 
and Terrorist: A Study of Risk Perceptions and Economics". The Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 39(1), 1-10 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. ,1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323. 
Wu, G. & Gonzalez, R. ,1996. "Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function." 
Management Science, 42(12), 1676–1690. 
  
24 
 
Yesuf, M., & Bluffstone, R.A., 2009. "Poverty, Risk Aversion, and Path Dependence in 
Low-Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(4), 1022-1037. 
  
  
25 
 
Table 1: Three Series of Pairwise Lottery Choices (in Mexican pesos) 
Option A Option B Expected payoff difference (A-B) 
Series 1     
P=3/10 P=7/10 P=1/10 P=9/10  
40 10 68 5 7.7 
40 10 75 5 7.0 
40 10 83 5 6.0 
40 10 93 5 5.2 
40 10 106 5 3.9 
40 10 125 5 2.0 
40 10 150 5 -0.5 
40 10 185 5 -4.0 
40 10 220 5 -7.5 
40 10 300 5 -15.5 
40 10 400 5 -25.5 
40 10 600 5 -45.5 
40 10 1000 5 -85.5 
40 10 1700 5 -155.5 
Series 2     
P=9/10 P=1/10 P=7/10 P=3/10  
40 30 54 5 -0.3 
40 30 56 5 -1.7 
40 30 58 5 -3.1 
40 30 60 5 -4.5 
40 30 62 5 -5.9 
40 30 65 5 -8.0 
40 30 68 5 -10 
40 30 72 5 -12.9 
40 30 77 5 -16.4 
40 30 83 5 -20.6 
40 30 90 5 -25.5 
40 30 100 5 -32.5 
40 30 111 5 -39.5 
40 30 130 5 -53.5 
Series 3     
P=1/2 P=1/2 P=1/2 P=1/2  
25 -4 30 -21   6.0 
4 -4 30 -21 -4.5 
1 -4 30 -21 -6.0 
1 -4 30 -16 -8.5 
1 -8 30 -16 -10.5 
1 -8 30 -14 -11.5 
1 -8 30 -11 -13.0 
Note: This table is the same as Table 4 in Tanaka et al. (2010).  
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Table 2: Lambda Identification Given Sigma 
Note: This table corresponds to Table 5 in Tanaka et al. (2010).  
 
Table 3: Randomization Test on Means of Emotions 
 
Variables  All Control Emotional Treatment Difference 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Male 0.55 0.53 .54 -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.024) (0.043) 
Years before graduating  2.34 2.39 2.30 0.09 
(0.001) (0.088) (0.060) (0.107) 
Age  20.84 20.77 20.86 -0.09 
 (0.002) (0.162) (0.104) (0.192) 
Last semester’s GPA  84.64 85.00 84.46 0.53 
 (0.008) (0.726) (0.490) (0.877) 
Number of bedrooms in 
the family household  
2.18 3.54 3.57 -0.03 
(0.001) (0.105) (0.062) (0.122) 
Number of cars in the 
family household  
3.56 2.05 2.25 -0.19 
(0.001) (0.106) (0.082) (0.134) 
Private University 
 
0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00 
(0.000) (0.035) (0.020) (0.042) 
Father’s educational 
level  
3.40 3.33 3.43 -0.10 
(0.001) (0.065) (0.045) (0.079) 
Mother’s educational 
level  
3.26 3.18 3.30 -0.12 
(0.001) (0.067) (0.044) (0.081) 
Number of siblings  1.62 1.62 1.62 0.00 
(0.001) (0.080) (0.054) (0.097) 
Scholarship  0.31 0.31 0.31 0.00 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.023) (0.040) 
Hours worked  last week  4.73 5.10 4.50 0.55 
(0.009) (0.793) (0.548) (0.964) 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Means and standard errors obtained from the final data set. The third  
column (Emotional Treatment) contains the information of those students who took the experiment with 
one question (moderate treatment) or two questions (strong treatment). Educational options were: 1. 
Completed Primary or less (less than 8 years of schooling), 2. Completed Junior High School (9 to 11 
years of schooling), 3. Completed High School (12-15 years of schooling), 4. Completed College (16 and 
more years of schooling). 
 
 
 
Switching 
Scenario 
𝜎 = 0.1 𝜎 = 0.5 𝜎 = 1.5 
0  𝜆 <0.123 𝜆 <0.184 𝜆 <0.445 
1  0.123< 𝜆 <1.237 0.184 < 𝜆 <1.346 0.445 < 𝜆 <1.771 
2  1.237< 𝜆 <1.955 1.346 < 𝜆 <1.733 1.771 < 𝜆 <1.85 
3  1.955 < 𝜆 <2.371 1.733 < 𝜆 <2.384 1.85 < 𝜆 <2.91 
4  2.371< 𝜆 <4.584 2.384 < 𝜆 <3.281 2.91 < 𝜆 <3.947 
5  4.584< 𝜆 <5.717 3.281< 𝜆 <4.9 3.947 < 𝜆 <5.49 
6  5.717 < 𝜆 <10.1693 4.9 < 𝜆 <9.17 5.49 < 𝜆 <11.787 
7  10.1693 < 𝜆 9.17 < 𝜆 11.7872 < 𝜆 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis: Curvature Parameter (σ) 
 
Variable No 
Treatment 
Moderate Treatment Either 
Treatment 
Strong 
Treatment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Male -0.033 -0.032 -0.030 -0.032 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
Years before 
Graduation 
0.025* 0.026** 0.025** 0.026** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age 0.015** 0.016** 0.014** 0.015** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Last Semester 
Average GPA 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of 
Bedrooms 
0.023* 0.022* 0.024* 0.023* 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Number of 
Automobiles 
0.024* 0.023* 0.023* 0.024* 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Private University -0.031 -0.032 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.0324) (0.032) 
Anger / 0.036 0.020 0.034 
/ (0.040) (0.029) (0.056) 
Sadness / -0.111*** -0.096*** -0.077*** 
/ (0.049) (0.035) (0.039) 
Fear / 0.009 0.002 0.017 
/ (0.037) (0.025) (0.040) 
Constant -0.107 -0.120 -0.075 -0.103 
(0.202) (0.197) (0.703) (0.199) 
No. of Observations 577 577 577 577 
R-squared 0.034 0.045 0.047 0.037 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Significance levels are denoted as * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Interval Regression Analysis. Loss aversion (𝜆) 
 
Variable No Treatment Moderate 
Treatment 
Either Treatment Strong Treatment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Male 0.591 0.596 0.558 0.542 
(0.402) (0.404) (0.398) (0.404) 
Years before 
Graduation 
-0.122 -0.114 -0.117 -0.141 
(0.209) (0.210) (0.208) (0.208) 
Age -0.072 -0.068 -0.064 -0.068 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) 
Last Semester Average 
GPA 
0.023 0.025 0.022 0.023 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Number of Bedrooms -0.060 -0.066 -0.061 -0.056 
(0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) 
Number of 
Automobiles 
-0.219* -0.203 -0.242* -0.225* 
(0.129) (0.128) (0.127) (0.129) 
Private University 1.306*** 1.200** 1.234*** 1.258*** 
(0.483) (0.482) (0.479) (0.482) 
Anger / -0.369 -0.566 -1.101*** 
/ (0.474) (0.412) (0.497) 
Sadness / 1.172 1.054 -0.183 
/ (0.821) (0.704) (0.978) 
Fear / 0.583 0.947** 0.056 
/ (0.471) (0.405) (0.458) 
Constant -0.107 1.064*** 1.469*** 1.687*** 
(0.202) (2.990) (2.962) (2.962) 
No. of Observations 577 575 575 575 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Significance levels are denoted as * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Curvature Parameter (σ) Kernel Density Estimate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Gaussian kernels with a bandwidth of 0.15. The kernel estimation 
was conducted with 607 observations from the final data set where sigma was different from missing. 
 
 
Figure 2. Loss Aversion Parameter (𝜆) lower bound Kernel Density Estimate 
 
 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 1.1.,The kernel estimation was 
conducted with 607 observations from the final data set where lambda was different from missing. 
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Figure 3: Average Weighting Function 
 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Simple average of 𝛼 taken from the final data set. 
 
Figure 4: Prelec’s One-Parameter (𝛼) Kernel Density function 
 
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Gaussian kernels with a bandwidth of 1. The kernel estimation was 
conducted with 607 observations from the final data set where alpha was different from missing. 
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Figure 5: Average Value Function and Emotions 
Sadness Anger 
  
Notes: Calculations by the authors. Simple average taken from the final data set using Equation (3). Panel 
A uses σ = 0.47 and 𝜆= 2.29 in the average function; the function with sadness uses σ = 0.39 and 𝜆= 2.29. 
Panel B uses uses σ = 0.47 and 𝜆= 2.29 in the average function; the function with anger uses σ = 0.47 and 
𝜆= 1.19. 
 
